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BACKGROUND
Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is one of the most dangerous materials in the world, thanks to the ease 
with which it can be utilized in a nuclear explosive device. Unlike plutonium, highly enriched uranium is 
suitable for use in the simplest kind of nuclear weapon, a so-called gun-type bomb. In gun-type devices, 
one subcritical piece of fissile material is fired at another subcritical target, which together form a critical 
mass and spark a chain reaction. The process is so simple and well understood that such a device does not 
need to be explosively tested; even the first such bomb, which was dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, was 
not tested prior to its use. In addition, HEU’s weak radioactivity makes it relatively easy to handle and 
hard to detect.1 Terrorists who acquire a sufficient quantity of HEU2 would not need to be backed by the 
scientific and financial resources of a state to construct a nuclear device.  
HEU differs from natural uranium or the low enriched uranium (LEU) used in nuclear power reactors in 
the concentration of the uranium-235 (U-235) isotope relative to other uranium isotopes. Natural uranium 
includes less than one percent U-235, while LEU contains less than 20 percent U-235, and HEU contains 
more than 20 percent U-235. The higher enrichment level of the HEU, the less is needed for a nuclear 
weapon with concentrations of 80 percent or more traditionally used in state nuclear weapons programs. 
Various industrial techniques are employed to separate and concentrate the U-235 found in natural 
uranium to higher enrichment levels. 
Massive amounts of HEU continue to be set aside for nuclear weapons and for powering nuclear vessels 
such as submarines and aircraft carriers. The primary civilian use of HEU has been in research reactors 
and other test facilities, where it has been employed because it generates a high flow of U-235 neutrons 
(neutron flux), useful for research and a number of specialized tasks. It has also been used in the process 
of producing medical isotopes and in civilian propulsion reactors. A half century ago, the Soviet Union 
and the United States started shipping HEU abroad as part of their peaceful nuclear cooperation programs 
(“Atoms for Peace” in the U.S. case) and the material ended up scattered widely around the globe 
(see Figure 1). But by the late 1970s, India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” and the rise of international 
terrorism had convinced the two superpowers to launch efforts to phase out research reactor use of HEU 
(particularly overseas) and replace it with LEU. These efforts were accelerated following the September 
2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and have made significant gains.
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Source: Global Fissile Material Report 2010: Balancing the Books, Fifth Annual Report, International Panel on 
Fissile Materials.
Nonetheless, a tremendous amount of work remains to be done to minimize and ultimately eliminate the 
use of HEU in the civilian sector, let alone tackle the broader task of preventing terrorist access to any 
such material. The U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), 
which leads U.S. HEU minimization efforts, assesses that after decades of efforts by the United States 
and Russia only one-third of the research facilities worldwide that use HEU have been converted to using 
LEU or shut down. NNSA estimates that at a minimum it will take more than another decade for these 
reactors to be entirely weaned off of HEU (see Figure 2). Moreover, the civilian facilities that use the 
most HEU have not been converted, with nine reactors in the United States and Europe alone consuming 
nearly 400 kg of HEU annually.3 As much as 70 tons of HEU are said to remain in the civilian sector, 
enough perhaps for several thousand nuclear weapons. 
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Source: Jordi Roglans-Ribas, Argonne National Laboratory.
Fortunately, an international consensus has emerged in recent years—as demonstrated in international 
forums such as Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conferences and UN Security Council 
Resolution 1887—that, given the security risks, the use of HEU outside military technologies should 
be minimized to the extent that it is technically and economically feasible. The 2010 Nuclear Security 
Summit also endorsed this consensus and several countries took individual steps to minimize or eliminate 
civil HEU. 
Nonetheless, the world still lacks a common and comprehensive strategy to minimize and ultimately 
eliminate this danger. As a result, the United States, France, South Korea and industry leaders have sought 
to use the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit to accelerate efforts to minimize HEU in the civilian 
sector. 
REDUCING RESEARCH REACTOR USE OF HEU 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the United States and the Soviet Union launched programs to eliminate 
weapon-grade HEU use in research reactors abroad. In the United States, the effort fell under the Reduced 
Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, which spearheaded the conversion of 76 
reactors to LEU by late 2011.4 The Soviet/Russian programs did not necessarily shift to material that was 
LEU, i.e. where less than 20 percent of the uranium is the fissile isotope U-235. However, the enrichment 
level was sufficiently low (in the Soviet case, 36 percent U-235) that it would be more difficult to build a 
workable device given the relatively large total amount of uranium required to have a sufficient quantity 
of U-235.  
These efforts sped up after the September 2001 terrorist attacks and the launch of the Bush 
administration’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative in 2004 which grouped together RERTR with several 
other related initiatives and which received substantially increased funding from Congress. 
U.S. efforts have been supported by an important policy lever: the Schumer Amendment to the 1992 
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Energy Policy Act, a U.S. law which allows the issuance of an export license for HEU for use in research 
or test reactors only under certain conditions: if there is no fuel or target of LEU that could be used in the 
importing reactor; if the recipient commits to use a low-enriched substitute when it becomes available; 
and if the United States is actively developing alternative fuels or targets for the reactor.5 As a result, from 
1993 to 1999 there were “virtually no exports” of HEU,6 compared to the nearly three tons exported by 
the United States annually in the late 1960s.7 The effect of this law was diluted in 2005, unfortunately, 
when Congress passed the Burr Amendment to the 2005 Energy Policy Act which permitted exports 
of HEU to the largest producers of medical isotopes (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands) without requiring a commitment to convert to the use of LEU targets. The Act does, 
however, still require that the receiving state either utilize LEU fuel in the reactor, or agree to convert to 
LEU fuel when such a substitute becomes available.  
The Bush administration also fostered bilateral cooperation with Russia. In 2005, Presidents George W. 
Bush and Vladimir Putin agreed that their countries would cooperate in research reactor conversion by 
providing LEU for any U.S. or Russian designed research reactors operating with HEU. Spent HEU fuel 
is then returned to the country of origin.8 In practice, this has largely meant that NNSA has paid Russia to 
help ship back HEU to Russia from countries such as Belarus, Poland, Serbia and Ukraine. This effort has 
yielded clear progress (see Figure 3): nearly all of the U.S. HEU abroad has been returned and much of 
the Soviet fuel has been returned to Russia.
Source: National Nuclear Security Administration.
Less success has been achieved in repatriating so called gap material that did not fall neatly into U.S. or 
Russian programs, such as material from third countries (see Figure 4).
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Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev emphasized their commitment to the 2005 agreements 
at their July 2009 summit in Moscow, and noted “the importance of HEU minimization in civilian 
applications” and to “support such efforts to the maximum extent possible, where feasible.”9 Those 
commitments were further extended in a September 2011 joint statement by the heads of the U.S. 
Department of Energy and the Russian state nuclear energy corporation Rosatom. It said that the two 
countries intended to “conduct joint efforts to convert research reactor cores in third countries from HEU 
fuel to LEU fuel, and examine the feasibility of converting U.S. and Russian HEU research reactors to 
LEU fuel in order to encourage other countries to take similar steps.”10 
Over the past decade, a broader international consensus has also begun to emerge regarding the need 
to minimize the use of HEU. The final document of the 2000 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review 
Conference “note[d] with appreciation that many research reactors are discontinuing the use of highly 
enriched uranium fuel in favor of low-enriched uranium fuel…”11 The subject was further discussed in the 
2005 review cycle, but that conference ended without a consensus final document.  
At the 2010 Review Conference, less progress was made on the subject of HEU than many had hoped 
for in the face of the many other challenges and tensions that dominated the conference. Nonetheless, the 
consensus final document did, “encourage States concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize 
highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use, where technically and economically feasible.”12  
Civilian HEU was also highlighted at the UN Security Council summit held in September 2009, chaired 
by President Obama. Resolution 1887, which was unanimously adopted at that meeting:
Calls upon all States to manage responsibly and minimize to the greatest extent that is 
technically and economically feasible the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian 
purposes, including by working to convert research reactors and radioisotope production 
processes to the use of low enriched uranium fuels and targets.13 [Emphasis in original.]
Finally, minimization of HEU was endorsed at the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, 
DC, which was attended by 38 heads of state or government, and 47 states in total. In the final 
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communiqué of the summit, the gathered states, “encourage[d] the conversion of reactors from highly 
enriched to low enriched uranium fuel and minimization of use of highly enriched uranium, where 
technically and economically feasible.”14  
The summit’s work plan further noted that participating states “will collaborate to research and develop 
new technologies that require neither highly enriched uranium fuels for reactor operation nor highly 
enriched uranium targets for producing medical or other isotopes…”15
In addition to the agreed work plan and communiqué, many of the participating states made national 
commitments to reduce the use of HEU in their own territories or contribute more generally to the cause 
of nuclear security. Canada, for example, agreed to return a large quantity of HEU to the United States 
and to fund HEU removals from Mexico and Vietnam. Ukraine committed to remove its entire stock of 
HEU, by the time of the next Nuclear Security Summit in 2012. In a significant step towards fulfilling 
this pledge, in May 2010, 56 kg of Russian-origin HEU spent fuel were removed from Ukraine. Later, 
in December 2010, a total of 50 kilograms of HEU fresh fuel was removed.16 Laura Holgate, a White 
House official who has helped direct U.S. efforts in the summit process, said that since the summit, over 




Converting reactors is a time consuming and technically demanding process akin to using a new kind of 
fuel in a car engine while seeking to maintain the car’s performance and safety and not altering its basic 
dimensions or operating costs. The challenge is particularly difficult given that research reactors are even 
less standardized than power reactors. As a result, almost every conversion of a reactor requires a lengthy 
study to determine what changes can be made safely even before undertaking the conversion process, 
which can take years. A very few reactors are seen as particularly difficult to convert either because of 
their individual dimensions or their high performance levels (see Figure 5). 
 Source: Pablo Adelfang, International Atomic Energy Agency, conference presentation 8-10 June 2011. 
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These numbers do not include 50 defense and icebreaker reactors.
Converting the reactor without altering its basic configuration generally involves finding ways to increase 
the amount of uranium in the core enough to make up for the fact that LEU has far less U-235 than HEU 
(18 percent LEU, for example, would have only one-fifth as much U-235 as 90 percent HEU). Reactor 
operators can increase the number of fuel assemblies relative to reflectors or “neutron poisons;” increase 
the amount of uranium in fuel assemblies by changing the basic design of fuel elements; change the 
thickness of the zirconium or aluminum metal cladding that wraps around the uranium fuel; or increase 
the density or alter the composition of the fuel within the elements (see Figure 6).
	  
Source: Tetiyakov, I.T., ROSATOM Company, JSC “NIKIET,” conference presentation 8-10 June 2011.
A number of different techniques have been advanced to accomplish these goals, some more successful 
than others. Nonetheless, the primary obstacles to conversion have been economic and political—
insufficient funding, determined political objections or a lack of political will to alter the facilities or 
change the practices of established institutions. In a few cases, such as with South Africa and Belarus, the 
lack of action has reflected the desire of those countries to leverage their stocks for other political goals. 
But more commonly, little action has occurred because of low threat perceptions, bureaucratic inertia and 
the resistance of reactor operators. Some institutions have feared losing capabilities needed for research 
or to produce sufficient quantities of medical isotopes as well as a loss of prestige that has sometimes 
accompanied the use of HEU. 
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Russia
Nowhere has this been more evident than in Russia. Although Russia has played an important role in 
taking back HEU that it previously supplied to other countries, it has done little to tackle its own use of 
civil HEU. Russia has as much as 30 tons of civil HEU, and more than half of the research reactors and 
test facilities worldwide that use the material. At the 2009 Obama-Medvedev summit, Russia agreed for 
the first time to conduct feasibility studies “to explore possibilities for conversion” of research reactor 
cores.18 The six feasibility studies are expected to be completed by the end of 2011. At that point, Russian 
officials will have to make a political decision whether to move forward with conversion, something they 
have long resisted. 19
In addition to standard research reactors, Russia has the world’s highest number of critical and subcritical 
assemblies facilities that involve very large amounts of HEU.20 These facilities, which are used for basic 
physics experimentation or to model reactor cores, represent difficult challenges both for proliferation 
and conversion. They have highly unique cores and fuel (i.e., sometimes without cladding). Not only does 
their fresh fuel present a danger, but their spent fuel is lightly irradiated and lies in easy-to-transport discs, 
similarly making it potentially attractive to terrorists. Moreover, these facilities consume HEU so slowly 
that they essentially have lifetime cores and there is little economic incentive to convert them since they 
can operate using their current HEU stocks.21 
Russia has 30 of these facilities, while European countries have only one. This difference, in part, reflects 
a Russian preference for hands-on experimentation instead of the computer simulations preferred by its 
European counterparts. (Similar problems surround pulse reactors that fall within the defense sector and 
so would not likely be subject to a civilian ban). One positive recent development in this regard is that 
Kazakhstan has been working with the United States to convert a Soviet-era critical assembly in Almaty. 
The researchers at the Kazakhstan Institute of Nuclear Physics are anticipating that conversion may begin 
this summer.22 
Like counterparts in the Russian and U.S. nuclear navies, Russia’s civilian icebreakers use HEU for naval 
propulsion with some ships carrying up to 200 kg of U-235.
Russia is also looming as a potential obstacle to the specific goal of minimizing the use of HEU in 
medical isotope production. Formerly only a bit player in the global market, Russia is revving up its 
medical isotope production and planning to use both HEU fuel and targets to do so—at least until it grabs 
a sizeable market share.
HEU AND MEDICAL ISOTOPE PRODUCTION
Russia is only one of the obstacles to progress in converting medical isotope facilities to LEU. Others 
have included the technical difficulty of converting reactors to operate with less-enriched fuel; the 
economic costs of conversion; the disincentives for LEU-based medical isotope production and the 
construction of new LEU-based isotope production reactors; anxieties that conversion will exacerbate real 
and potential shortages of such isotopes; and political difficulties created by licensing requirements and 
by states and industries seeking market advantage. 
Such isotopes are an important feature of modern medicine, particularly in the fields of medical imaging 
and diagnostics. The major medical isotope is the very short-lived technetium-99m, which can be 
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chemically incorporated into small molecule ligands and proteins that concentrate in specific organs or 
tissues when injected into the body, allowing doctors to use them in medical scans that examine particular 
areas of the body (see Table 1).23
Table 1: Selected Examples of Tc-99m Kits for Nuclear Medicine Diagnostic Imaging24
Kit Name  Imaging Procedure   
Technetium Tc-99m Medronate (MDP) Bone Scan
Technetium Tc-99m Albumin Aggregated (MAA) Lung Perfusion
Technetium Tc-99m Pentetate (DTPA) Kidney Scan and Function
Technetium Tc-99m Sulfur Colloid Liver Scan
Sentinel Lymph Node Localization
Technetium Tc-99m Sestamibi Cardiac Perfusion
Technetium Tc-99m Exametazime Brain Perfusion
Technetium Tc-99m Mebrofenin Gall Bladder Function
Technetium Tc-99m Etidronate Bone Scan
Technetium Tc-99m Disofenin Gall Bladder Function
Technetium Tc-99m Succimer (DMSA) Kidney Scan and Function
Technetium Tc-99m Tetrofosmin Cardiac Perfusion
Technetium Tc-99m Bicisate Brain Perfusion
Technetium Tc-99m Red Blood Cell Blood Pool Imaging
Technetium Tc-99m Sodium Pertechnetate Thyroid, Salivary Gland, Meckel’s Scan
Technetium Tc-99m Lidofenin Gall Bladder Function
Technetium Tc-99m Mertiatide (MAG3) Kidney Scan and Function
Technetium Tc-99m Oxidronate (HDP) Bone Scan   
Note: MAA = methacrylic acid, MDP = methylene diphosphonate, DTPA = diethylene triamine Pentaacetic acid, DMSA = 
dimercaptosuccinic acid, MAG3 = mercapto acetyl triglycine, HDP = hydroxymethylene diphosphonate.
Source: National Academy of Sciences.
More than 30 million such examinations take place around the world each year, with the United States 
alone accounting for 14 million procedures annually.25 
Because technetium-99m has a half-life of only about six hours26 it must be produced continuously rather 
than stockpiled. Historically, it has been produced from the decay of the isotope molybdenum-99. That 
isotope has been produced by irradiating an HEU target inside a research reactor (with the reactor, in 
turn, traditionally fueled by HEU). Neutrons from the reactor split the uranium-235 atoms in the HEU 
target. Some of the fragments created by these splits are molybdenum-99 (henceforth “Mo-99”). In order 
to maximize the production of Mo-99, which has a half-life of 66 hours, the target is irradiated only 
briefly—five to seven days in most cases.27 The target is then purified to produce bulk Mo-99, which 
is then placed in generators to produce technetium-99m. Only around three percent of the uranium is 
used up in this process, leaving tens of kilograms of HEU left over each year as lightly-irradiated and 
proliferation-sensitive waste.28
In addition, HEU has often been used as fuel in the reactors. The total annual world demand for HEU for 
the production of medical isotopes is 40-50 kg,29 nearly enough to produce two bombs each year with 
considerably more fresh and spent HEU fuel stockpiled around the globe. Production of such isotopes has 
been governed by a highly concentrated and unusually structured industry in which more than 90 percent 
of Mo-99 has been produced by irradiation in five largely government-run research reactors and then 
processed largely by four predominantly commercial Mo-99 processors (see Figure 7). 30 
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Source: Ira Goldman, “Toward a More Secure Future? Mo-99 Supply,” Sept. 2011.
For the last few years, NNSA has used a two-pronged strategy to establish a reliable supply of Mo-99 
that does not utilize HEU. Domestically, NNSA has reached cost-sharing agreements (“Cooperative 
Agreements”) with four U.S. based producers to pursue nontraditional approaches to Mo-99 production 
that do not involve irradiating targets in traditional research reactors. The idea is to eventually use these 
technologies to replace HEU-based production from countries such as Canada, which have traditionally 
provided the bulk of U.S. medical isotopes. The United States, in turn, provides nearly half of the world 
market for isotopes. 
Meanwhile, the U.S and the IAEA have sought to both expand the number of small scale regional Mo-99 
producers in areas like Latin America or Eastern Europe and to help the major overseas producers convert 
to LEU. The toughest development challenges have involved the development of higher uranium density 
fuels and targets. As described, the increased density for fuel is needed to ensure that there is sufficient 
uranium-235 in the fuel to ensure a sufficient uranium flux. For the target, the challenge is to maximize 
the yield of Mo-99, while minimizing waste from the additional uranium needed for LEU targets and 
seeking to ensure, to the extent possible, compatibility with existing processes for target dissolution and 
Mo-99 recovery.31 To date, all but one of the five reactors that have traditionally been used for large-scale 
production of Mo-99 (and more than 90 percent of the market supply) have been converted to use LEU 
fuel and the lone holdout, the BR-2 reactor in Belgium, is in the process of being converted although 
facing some technical difficulties in doing so.32  
The major reactors producing medical isotopes are spread across three continents: three in Europe 
including the BR-2 in Belgium, HFR in Netherlands and OSIRIS in France; the NRU in Canada; and the 
SAFARI-1 in South Africa (see Table 2).  
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Fuel/targets Date of first commissioning
BR-2 Belgium 140 5200 25-65 HEU/HEU 1961
HFR Netherlands 300 4680 35-70 LEU/HEU 1961
LVR-15 Czech Republic — >600 — LEU/HEU 1957
MARIA Poland — 700-1500 — HEU/HEU 1974
NRU Canada 300 4680 35-70 LEU/HEU 1957
OPAL Australia 290 1000 – 1500 — LEU/LEU 2006
SAFARI-1 South Africa 305 2500 10-30 LEU/LEU* 1965
RA-3 Argentina 230 240 <2 LEU/LEU 1967
*Full conversion awaiting approval from foreign regulators.
Source: OECD Nuclear Energy Agency; National Nuclear Security Administration. 
The conversion of LEU targets has proven an economic challenge as much as a technical one. A 2009 
National Academies of Science study commissioned by Congress to consider the production of medical 
isotopes without HEU found that there are “no technical reasons that adequate quantities [of medical 
isotopes] cannot be produced from LEU targets in the future.”34 Indeed, LEU targets, in many cases, could 
simply be substituted in reactors, but this simple change would require reactor and Mo-99 processors 
to process about five times as many targets and an equivalent increase in waste. Some processors have 
claimed that their facilities might not be able to accommodate these higher throughput requirements 
without substantial modification, although some other process changes could mitigate this need. The 
increased reactor irradiation capacity that would be required could also be limited.35 Other alternatives 
in substituting LEU targets for the HEU variety include those similar to the changes in fuel elements 
and assemblies: making targets larger, or with a greater uranium density, or with more uranium meat 
and less cladding. All of these options would enable irradiating and processing fewer targets than simply 
substituting LEU fuel into existing targets, but could require new processes for producing Mo-99. In any 
case, production costs would likely rise marginally compared to the existing HEU targets and process, but 
without significantly increasing the cost of diagnostic imaging.36 
One of the four major Mo-99 producers, the South African company NECSA, has committed to operating 
its medical isotope production facilities solely on the basis of LEU, with financial support from NNSA.  
In June 2009, the company announced that it had fueled the reactor itself with LEU. In October 2010, the 
United States signed a $25 million contract with a consortium led by NECSA (and also including ANSTO 
of Australia, a smaller all LEU producer) to import a significant quantity of isotopes produced completely 
with LEU. The first FDA-approved shipment of bulk Mo-99 was provided in December to a Boston-
based company that provides technecium-99m generators and for a time in June 2011 the consortium 
was supplying one-third of the U.S. demand for Mo-99. 37 The targets have almost twice the uranium 
density of the previous HEU targets with South Africa hoping to start development in soon of new targets, 
perhaps with even higher density.38 European processors and reactors are planning to convert to using 
LEU targets by 2015.39 Australia and Argentina, have utilized LEU for several years and Australia would 
like to substantially increase production and processing of LEU isotopes if market conditions permit.40 
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Table 3: Potential New projects for Mo-99 production
REACTOR Six-day ciEOP/yr
Six day ci
EOP/wk Weeks/yr Potential first year
PROJECTS WITH PROCESSING FACILITIES AS PART OF PROJECT
ROSATOM*/** 52 000 1 000 52.0 2013
ROSATOM*/** -TOTAL 130 000 2 500 52.0 2013
Babcock and Wilcox 144 000 3 000 48.0 2014
China advanced RR*** 25 710 1 000 25.7 2015
CNEA, Argentina - - - 2018
SAFARI - 2 108 930 2 500 43.5 2020
PROJECTS REQUIRING ADDITIONAL PROCESSING FACILITIES****
MURR** 156 000 3 000 52.0 2012
FRM - II** 102 860 3 000 34.3 2015
GE - Hitachi 144 000 3 000 48.0 2014
US - LEU target technology 144 000 3 000 48.0 2014
US - Accelerator technology 144 000 3 000 48.0 2014
India - - - 2015
OPAL - - - 2015
INR, Pitesti** 120 000 3 000 40.0 2015
Jules Horowitz*** 108 000 3 000 36.0 2016
South Korea (KAERI) - - - 2017
PALLAS 266 390 6 215 42.9 2020
MYRRHA 178 290 5 200 34.3 2022
* Project includes three reactors, two of which would be used to produce Mo-99 in a continuous fashion, with the third being a 
back up.
** Research reactor already exists, but is not yet irradiating targets for Mo-99 production.
*** Under active construction.
**** Projects in Europe would face a processing capacity limitation. 
Source: OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, “Supply of Medical Radioisotopes,” p.18; Ira Goldman, “Toward a More Secure 
Future? Mo-99 Supply,” September 2011. 
These changes come at an economic cost—the South African process is said to cost at least 30-40 percent 
more than the previous HEU process—although the cost increase for the delivered pharmaceutical 
would be a fraction of that because it includes other costs that would not change, such as transport and 
marketing—the increased irradiation costs, for example, would represent less than one percent of the total 
cost.41 NECSA is also still trying to iron out bugs in the process—particularly problems with obtaining 
a consistent yield of Mo-99.42 The two major European producers Covidien and the Belgian National 
Institute for Radioelements (IRE) are working with NNSA towards being able to process LEU targets. In 
doing so, they have opted to accept a lower yield in the short term in order to meet the 2015 deadline for 
conversion. Over the longer term, they are working with the U.S. national laboratories to develop high 
yield targets intended to yield more Mo-99 and produce less waste. 
Still, particularly in the short term, the combination of lower yield, waste and other costs43 will put 
processors like the South Africans, Europeans, and Australians at a disadvantage compared to the 
Canadian giant MDS Nordion, which has shown no sign that it intends to convert from HEU to LEU 
targets. For now, Nordion continues to rely primarily on Mo-99 produced by the aging NRU reactor in 
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Chalk River, Canada, managed by the government-run Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL). The 
facility, built in 1957, provides Mo-99 for about one-third of the world’s medical isotopes and often more 
than half of those used in the world’s biggest market, the United States. NRU operates on LEU fuel but 
uses HEU targets and Nordion does not have a processing line capable of processing LEU targets. Canada 
announced in 2010 that it would shut down the NRU reactor in 2016, but Nordion plans to continue 
processing HEU-based Mo-99 from Russia. Since Russia can provide its own HEU for the targets, it 
cannot be touched by the Schumer or Burr amendments.
In addition, NECSA and some officials in the countries also cite the difficulties in winning licensing 
approval from European and other governmental authorities to use the new materials in medical 
treatments, pointing to “complex and cumbersome” regulations as deterring potential customers. NECSA 
officials point out that technetium-99m manufacturers in Europe have to gain regulatory approval for new 
LEU-based isotopes from each country in the union. Even though the new LEU-based Mo-99 conforms 
to current standards for the isotope and should not affect the resulting technetium-99m, these regulatory 
approvals are expensive and time-consuming as they involve several sets of validation tests with many 
samples.44 The licensing holdup has slowed NECSA’ s conversion to full LEU-based production by an 
estimated two years—to the end of 2013.45 
By contrast, the U.S. government took great pains to ensure that licensing did not pose a significant 
obstacle to the development of LEU-based Mo-99, closely coordinating efforts between NNSA, the Food 
and Drug Administration and other agencies.46 
In addition to political obstacles, politicians have had to confront periodic shortages in the Mo-99 market, 
the result of deep structural problems. Market demand for Mo-99 has soared over recent decades amid 
rising demand for diagnostic scans; however, there has been little incentive for new irradiation facilities 
to be constructed as current producers built their facilities decades ago with government funding. They 
continue to benefit from operating subsidies and pass these on to processors in the form of below-market 
Mo-99 prices. The result has been an aging of the research reactor fleet, particularly those involved in 
isotope production. 47 
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Likewise, the growth of processing facilities has been limited by a lack of market incentives including 
government reimbursement rates for isotopes that do not reflect the full costs of processing. The lack of 
adequate geographic distribution of these facilities also hampers the final supply of isotopes.48 
These problems were made evident between May 2009 and August 2010 by the shut down of the NRU 
reactor. A survey of 1217 respondents conducted by the Society of Nuclear Medicine shortly after the 
Chalk River shut down found 90.71 percent of their facilities were affected by the Mo-99 shortage, 
with 64.17 percent having no access to an alternate technetium generator source. Many of the scheduled 
treatments had to be postponed, cancelled, or changed.49 Further exacerbating the shortage, the HFR in the 
Netherlands was shut down for scheduled maintenance for a month in July 2009. Together, the reactors 
normally supply two-thirds of the world’s Mo-99.50 
Consequences of the 2009-2010 NRU Shutdown 
The extended shut down affected the Mo-99 market in three different ways, all of which have an effect on 
efforts to convert to LEU fuel and targets, both in the short and long term:
1) Governments sought ways to ensure a sufficient supply of isotopes given long-term projections 
of supply shortages.51 Methods included better sharing of information about proposed reactor 
shutdowns for maintenance reasons and efforts to coordinate such shutdowns and conversions to 
LEU fuel or targets so as not to interfere with sufficient supply. Longer-term measures included 
increasing production and asking the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency to hold meetings and conduct fundamental studies to make recommendations 
for altering the market structure to prevent such supply shocks. The NEA concluded that 
governments should terminate their effective subsidies for irradiation facilities and allow both 
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these facilities and processors to recover full market prices. It also concluded that this change 
would not have a significant effect on the price charged to patients or their availability.  
2) One way of increasing production was for new entrants to join the field or for reactors that only 
supplied local markets to seek more of a global reach. Some of these included countries such as 
Poland and the Czech Republic that initially used HEU but are now moving to convert. Other 
countries such as South Korea have decided to move forward with their own LEU-based (see 
Table 3).52 A worrying case, however, has been that of Russia. As noted before, the Russian Mo-
99 processor ISOTOPE concluded an agreement with MDS Nordion in September 2010 to supply 
the Canadian processor with Mo-99 and hopes to provide around one-fifth of the world market for 
Mo-99 (see Table 3).53 The Mo-99 will be produced by Russia’s Rosatom, which employs both 
HEU fuel and targets in its reactors at Dmitrovgrad. Russian officials have indicated that they will 
only begin to consider conversion after they capture this market share and they are confident there 
is sufficient supply of medical isotopes in the global market.54
3) The 2009-10 supply crisis prompted physicians and other participants in the supply chain to 
try to eke out greater efficiencies in the use of Mo-99 and technetium 99-m and for doctors to 
restrain the use of the technology. Demand dropped during the supply crisis for medical imaging 
services using Mo-99 and has continued for at least some time afterwards. That led to an effective 
oversupply as the NRU facility was restarted and new entrants joined the field.55 Companies 
like NECSA whose bottom lines were already squeezed by having to pay a premium for using 
fully LEU-based Mo-99 felt a particular pinch. The changes also indicated that there was more 
flexibility in demand than may believed previously and that better models for forecasting demand 
and how it and public health might be affected under various scenarios were needed. 
U.S. Legislation 
Meanwhile, some in Congress have attempted to reinvigorate U.S. leadership by effectively repealing the 
Burr Amendment and supporting domestic production of fully LEU-based isotopes. In 2009, the House 
of Representatives passed “The American Medical Isotopes Act” on a 400-17 vote. Similar legislation 
passed the Senate in November 2011. The Senate legislation provides three key incentives for LEU-based 
production. First, the act would once again ban U.S. exports of HEU for targets to Western Europe and 
Canada, although the legislation provided for such exports to be phased out over 7 to 13 years, a time 
when many of the current reactors using HEU targets will have ceased operating. It also authorizes cost-
sharing arrangements to generate domestic isotope production (as noted above, four projects in the United 
States have already received some seed funding and are highlighted in Table 3). Finally, it established 
government responsibility for waste disposition, providing a means to relieve operators of the financial, 
practical and legal burdens of waste disposal.56 To become law, the House must pass the Senate bill or 
compromise legislation must be approved by both Houses. 
Obama administration officials, while welcoming the legislation, have also told House lawmakers 
recently that they would like to develop incentives to encourage purchases of LEU based isotopes, in 
particular to deal with the potential HEU-based imports from Russia. Such “preferential procurement” 
they said could include special labels for LEU-based isotopes, additional export constraints on HEU 
as LEU-based isotopes become available, examining whether to change the costs, fees, and other 
reimbursement processes to favor LEU-based isotopes. 
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THE 2012 SUMMIT: AMBITIOUS HOPES, BUT MINIMAL OUTCOME? 
Some ambitious ideas have been put forward as the sherpas and sous-sherpas have engaged in the process 
of drafting a communiqué for the 2012 Seoul Summit. 
France, for example, has circulated a non-paper calling for the creation of HEU management guidelines 
(modeled on existing plutonium guidelines) to provide greater transparency on states’ HEU holdings and 
tougher standards for security, transportation and international transfers. The guidelines would aim in 
part at raising the cost of storing the material, encouraging states that are making little use of stocks to 
eliminate or consolidate them.57 
The United States has sought to convince summit participants to endorse a 2015 deadline for eliminating 
the use of HEU in the production of medical isotopes, partly in a bid to convince Russia to embark on 
course of LEU-based production rather than HEU-based production.
Those negotiating the summit communiqué continue to discuss the HEU guidelines and isotopes 
initiatives, but have met substantial resistance. Some developing countries have resisted drafting HEU 
guidelines as part of the summit process, saying such issues were best addressed within the IAEA. They 
and Russia have also resisted a U.S.-led effort to set a date certain for phasing out the use of HEU in 
research reactors that produce medical isotopes. However, U.S. officials have indicated that European 
officials may be willing to commit bilaterally to a 2015 deadline for conversion and to unveil that 
commitment at the summit.  
The difficulties in winning support for these efforts reflects in part the problems often seen in large 
multilateral engagement: difficulty focusing the participants towards problem-solving and away from 
established positions, a tendency to settle at the lowest common denominator and challenges in making 
sure all the participants are still engaged and on board with discussions. The organizers have also faced a 
more basic problem of questions about the legitimacy and lifespan of the nuclear security summit process 
vis-à-vis other more established multinational institutions such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
review process or the IAEA. Although these bodies tend to give short shrift to nuclear security, they are 
the strongholds of developing countries, which generally view nuclear security as a lower priority than 
other nuclear policy goals. Some countries have also questioned the legitimacy of any global attempt 
to address the issue of nuclear security, seeing it a potential violation of their national sovereignty and 
something that would allow other countries to discover their security vulnerabilities. 
Meanwhile, South Korea and the United States continue to encourage countries to make “house gifts” 
related to HEU minimization. One particularly telltale sign will be how forthcoming Russia is with its 
pledges in this field. Two important gifts in this regard are expected to be the conversion of Poland’s 
MARIA reactor and the Czech LVR-15 reactor.58 
However, one gift that the organizers had hoped to receive is now not expected to materialize. Belarus, 
which was excluded from the first summit for its failure to make a similar commitment on HEU, 
subsequently made a similarly important commitment. In December 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hilary 
Clinton and Sergei Martynov, the foreign minister of Belarus, signed a joint statement in which Minsk 
said, it “has decided to eliminate all of its stocks” of HEU by the time of the Seoul Summit. NNSA 
officials said shortly thereafter that it was anticipated that the shipments of the most dangerous fuel, 
including 40 kg (88 pounds) of weapon-grade HEU would take place in early 2012, shortly before the 
summit. In August 2011, however, Minsk said it would suspend the shipments until the United States 
lifted sanctions it had recently imposed on Minsk in response to a crackdown by President Alexander 
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Lukashenko on his political opponents and the regime’s ties with Iran.59  
One contribution to HEU minimization may come from an unexpected source. South Korea is looking 
to build a parallel meeting for industry leaders slated to occur around the Nuclear Security Summit 
into something more substantial than the similar event that took place in Washington in 2010. The 
organizers of the Korean industry meeting are planning to put together three working groups—on 
HEU minimization, the intersection of safety and security and information security—that will draft 
recommendations related to industry for political leaders at the summit. One idea that might be considered 
by the HEU group is support for a voluntary code of conduct on HEU minimization in which various 
stakeholders—operators, customers, governments—can pledge to take steps to minimize and ultimately 
eliminate HEU.60
NEW STRATEGIES 
Whatever the eventual outcome of the communiqué, it is important to note that the summit is just one 
milestone in a long-term and already decades-long effort to minimize HEU. In order to achieve success in 
the future, this effort should include the following goals:
1. Promote HEU Guidelines. These do not necessarily need to be enacted by the summit. After all, 
they do not require the support of a large number of countries, just those countries with civil 
stocks of HEU. It may be easier to win support for these efforts one-by-one rather than in an 
extended multilateral negotiation.
2. Set a Global Deadline for Phasing Out HEU-Based Medical Isotopes. Ideally, given the European 
commitment to a 2015 deadline this deadline should be set at 2015. But if a slightly later deadline 
is needed to win Russian acquiescence, this might be worth the delay. Government licensing 
authorities and industry could also commit to having appropriate licensing rules in place by the 
time countries are able to produce isotopes from LEU fuel and targets so this does not become an 
obstacle to conversion.  
3. End Subsidies for Irradiated Mo-99 from Research Reactors. In the near future, governments 
should raise prices of irradiated Mo-99 produced using HEU fuel or targets to market levels as 
suggested by the HLG-MR. LEU-based producers should be able to receive effective subsidies 
until HEU use is phased out as well as subsidies for conversion. Host governments or particularly 
in the case of Russia, international donors such as the United States or Canada could provide 
subsidies.  
4. Engage in Preferential Procurement. In addition to the United States, national governments and 
the World Health Organization should consider supporting or requiring government purchases of 
LEU-based isotopes. This could be on the agenda for the 2014 summit in addition to a deadline 
for phase-out.
5. Wield U.S. Leverage on Medical Isotopes. Should these efforts fail or as a possible supplement, 
the United States could take advantage of its leverage as the world’s largest importer of Mo-99 
in one of several ways. One option, given that domestic producers will avoid HEU, would be 
to legislate that the United States must halt the import of HEU-based versions of these isotopes 
when a sufficient supply of the alternatives is available. Another option would be to require U.S. 
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health authorities to terminate authorization for use of HEU-based versions when a sufficient 
supply of the alternatives is available. A third option would be to impose a tax on HEU-based 
versions of these isotopes, channeling any resulting revenue to support domestic production 
without HEU.   
6. Cultivate New Leaders. For decades, the United States has borne the lion’s share of the HEU 
minimization effort. Particularly given U.S. budget difficulties, other countries, particularly 
fast-growing Asian countries such as South Korea and China, need to do more in this regard and 
fortunately, both are already beginning to do so. South Korea’s efforts are detailed in the sidebar 
while China has begun to convert the HEU-based Miniature Neutron Source Reactors that it 
supplied to other countries and pledged to take back their fuel. An instrument that might be used 
to solicit further contributions in this regard, particularly for converting Russian reactors is the 
G-8 Partnership against Weapons of Mass Destruction, which seems to be casting about for a new 
mission. 
7. Ban Other HEU Uses. Track 1.5 discussions should be initiated to see if progress can be made 
forward in banning other uses of civil HEU such as fast reactor core and space reactors. HEU-
based space reactors, for example, have been used in the past for propulsion and to power 
satellites, but none are currently in operation.61 This presents an opportunity for Russia and the 
United States in particular, that could prevent other countries (such as Iran) from citing such 
reactors as a reason to move to weapon-grade HEU.  
8. Initiate a Discussion on the Conversion of Naval Reactors. France and others in the now 
regularized P-5 discussions on disarmament and nonproliferation should seek to use that forum 
to initiate a discussion on the use of LEU in naval and propulsion fuel. If this is not possible, 
this should be the subject of a dialogue between the United States and Russia, perhaps led by 
their academies of science. As long as fabrication or fuel facilities are still handling HEU, the 
possibility of terrorist acquisition of this material remains high. 
9. Link Efforts to Minimize Civil HEU to Efforts to Curtail Weapons HEU. In the long term, the 
efforts to ban HEU in civil purposes and naval fuel will need to be linked with discussions on a 
Fissile Material Control Treaty, which would ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear 
weapons. The initial goal should be to ban all production of HEU for any purpose, civil or 
military. In the short term, the United States and Russia could bolster other countries’ support for 
efforts to minimize civil HEU by taking further steps to reduce their holdings of weapons HEU. 
By the time it ends in 2013, the “Megatons to Megawatts” program will have downblended 500 
tons of Russian weapons HEU for use in U.S. power reactors. In particular, the two countries 




Korea’s Contribution to HEU Minimization Efforts—By Ferenc Dalnoki Veress
In the 1970s, the United States exported more than 28 kg of HEU to the Republic of Korea that was used 
to fuel two TRIGA reactors for isotope production and research. Both reactors are now decommissioned, 
and all of the U.S.-origin HEU in the form of fresh and spent fuel bundles has been shipped back to the 
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United States. In addition, to the repatriation of U.S.-origin HEU, the Republic of Korea has also become 
an important technical contributor to the global effort to convert research reactors from utilizing HEU fuel 
to LEU. It has developed a novel technique known as Centrifugal Atomization to create an LEU fuel with 
a greater uranium density. This technique produces small uranium-molybdenum (U-Mo) spheres that can 
be easily incorporated into a fuel element matrix made of another metal (for example aluminum). Using 
this technique, the U-Mo metal is heated to a temperature greatly exceeding its melting point causing 
the bulk metal to change state from a solid into a liquid. The U-Mo metal liquid is then deposited onto 
a rapidly rotating disk which forces the liquid to quickly become droplets a fraction the size of a human 
hair. The droplets cool immediately and are collected in the solid state at the periphery of the disk where 
they can be incorporated into research reactor fuels. 
This Centrifugal Atomization technique outperforms the standard technique, which is to grind solid U-Mo 
metal into small spheres. The fuel was originally developed for Korea’s HANARO research reactor (at 
KAERI’s headquarters in Daejeon); however the Korean program has been so successful that various 
versions of the fuel have been exported to labs in the United States, France and Argentina since 1997. 
In fact, this year KAERI signed a memorandum of understanding with the United States to help develop 
fuels for the BR-2 high performance reactor in Belgium, which still uses tens of kilograms of HEU 
annually to produce medical isotopes. As part of the agreement, KAERI will supply as much as 100 kg 
of fuel at no cost. Korea remains an important partner in the global effort to reduce the enrichment of 
research reactors. The KAERI-Belgium agreement will be announced in March at the Seoul Nuclear 
Security Summit as one of Korea’s “House gifts.” 
In another contribution to HEU minimization efforts, Korea is in the process of constructing a new reactor 
near Pusan specifically dedicated to the indigenous production of medical isotopes. The targets used will 
utilize a thin LEU uranium foil that has been developed as part of a Coordinated Research Project (CRP) 
collaboration with many other nations under the leadership of the IAEA. This novel target is expected 
to be used in many indigenous research reactors around the world. Korea’s contribution has been very 
significant in delivering test foils to many of the participants of the CRP to use and test new Mo-99 
production techniques. 
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